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Abstract 
This paper discusses the fiscal policy reactions and economic policies of 
European countries and the United States during the Great Depression. Economic 
as well as economic history literature has tended to overlook the fiscal policy 
aspects of the Great Depression, in particular in relation to European countries. 
This paper concentrates specifically on this aspect, providing a comprehensive 
discourse on the background of the crisis and using for analysis a data set 
compiled from available international sources. On this basis, central government 
reactions, mainly on the expenditure side, are analysed. Thus, this paper provides 
new information concerning the economic policies during the Great Depression 
and helps to understands how the Great Depression developed. 
The conclusion reached is that fiscal policies between the two World Wars were 
mainly neo-classical, i.e. expenditure reacted to the development of revenue. In 
certain European countries, for example the Netherlands and Sweden, some 
counter-cyclical fiscal policies can be observed. However, as the governments 
there were smaller and the effect therefore comparably limited, this did not play a 
key role in the economic recovery. Finally, the paper briefly discusses the 
similarities and differences between the Great Depression and the current crisis. 
Key words: Great Depression, fiscal policy, counter-cyclical, Keynesian fiscal 
policy, neo-classical economic policy, economic policy 
JEL classification numbers: H30, H50, H60, H62, H63, N12, N14, N42, N44 
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tässä paperissa keskitytään 1930-luvun laman finanssipolitiikkaan ja yleisemmin 
talouspolitiikkaan Euroopan maissa ja Yhdysvalloissa. Tätä aihetta on erityisesti 
Euroopan maiden osalta käsitelty hyvin vähän sekä taloustieteellisessä että 
taloushistoriallisessa kirjallisuudessa. Tässä paperissa keskitytään ensiksi kriisin 
taustoihin ja tämän jälkeen analysoidaan eri maiden finanssipoliittisia reaktioita 
olemassa olevien kansainvälisten lähteiden avulla. Tältä pohjalta on tarkasteltu 
julkisen keskushallinnon reaktioita talouskriisiin. Aineiston saatavuuden vuoksi 
analyysi keskittyy lähinnä menopuolelle. Tämä paperi näin ollen valottaa 
kokonaan uuden näkökulman laman aikaiseen talouspolitiikkaan ja auttaa 
ymmärtämään miten lama kehittyi. 
Paperin keskeiset johtopäätökset ovat, että suurimmissa osissa maissa laman 
aikainen talouspolitiikka oli neoklassista, ts. julkiset menot reagoivat suoraan 
tulokertymään. Kuitenkin joissakin maissa kuten Alankomaissa ja Ruotsissa on 
havaittavissa lievää keynesiläistä vastasyklistä politiikkaa. Nykypäivään 
verrattuna julkinen sektori oli kuitenkin huomattavasti pienempi ja näin ollen 
vastasyklisen talouspolitiikan merkitys kriisistä toipumiseen oli myös 
kohtuullisen merkityksetön. Paperin lopuksi keskitytään pohtimaan nykyisen 
kriisin ja 1930-luvun laman eroja ja yhtäläisyyksiä.  
Asiasanat: Suuri lama, finanssipolitiikka, vastasyklinen talouspolitiikka, 
keynesiläinen finanssipolitiikka, neoklassinen talouspolitiikka, talouspolitiikka 
JEL-luokittelu: H30, H50, H60, H62, H63, N12, N14, N42, N44 
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1. 0BIntroduction 
The current economic and financial crisis has been likened in many respects to 
the Great Depression. One obvious similarity is that both recessions originated in 
the United States. The Great Depression is generally associated with October 
1929 and the initial stock market crash in New York. The current crisis also 
started in the United States with the collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market 
and from there spread around the world. In terms of economic data, the decline in 
global industrial output also tracks the decline in industrial output observed 
during the Great Depression.F1F  
However, one crucial difference between the current crisis and the Great 
Depression is the policy response, in particular in the area of fiscal policy. While 
government policy-making seemed “helpless” during the Great Depression, the 
current crisis elicited a massive response not only from central banks, but also 
from fiscal policy-makers.F2F  
To date economic literature has largely overlooked the influence of fiscal policy 
on the Great Depression. This is surprising because “since the Great Depression 
macroeconomists have laboured diligently in an effort to understand the 
circumstances that led to the wholesale collapse of the economyF3F”. However, 
while the majority of papers and articles on fiscal policies focus on the 
development of one specific country, this paper aims to focus on European 
countries as the majority of existing literature on the Great Depression deals with 
the United States.F4F One reason for the lack of literature on fiscal policy would 
seem to be that many researchers concluded from the prevailing neo-classical 
approach widely held in the 1920s and 1930s – which did not recognise a 
particular role for fiscal policy in the fine-tuning of the economy – that fiscal 
policy played a negligible role. In addition, governments during the 1920s and 
1930s were much smaller than today and consequently the importance of fiscal 
variables was also less marked. The common understanding was that from the 
point of view of economic growth, it was not important whether the government 
or private sector was consuming. In addition, borrowing money was not viewed 
as a relevant activity. If the money was loaned from the domestic financial 
markets, it was believed it would have been consumed domestically anyway. 
                                              
1 Eichengreen and O’Rourke, 2009. 
2 Compare to the conclusion of Cecchetti, 1997. 
3 Cecchetti, 1997. 
4 There are some attempts to analyse fiscal policies: Brown (1956) analysed fiscal policies in the United 
States. However, the lack of data means it is not possible to replicate for Europe the detailed analysis he 
presented in his paper. Topp (1988) analysed the development of Danish fiscal policies from the Great 
Depression to the end of the Second World War from a theoretical point of view. Virén (2006) also 
conducted an empirical exercise comparing fiscal policies in Europe before and after the Second World 
War. 
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Thus it would not affect overall economic development. Similarly, loaning 
money abroad was seen as using future consumption possibilities. The idea of 
medium-term budget balance over the business cycle had not yet been accepted 
and governments tried to maintain a balanced budget in each budget year. 
Taxation, loaning money and government consumption were considered only 
useful for redistributive actions.F5F The Keynesian idea of the government’s role as 
a “balancer” of economic growth and the idea that an investment would actually 
create additional growth were not predominant, even though similar ideas had 
been presented before the publication of John Maynard Keynes’ classic study 
entitled “The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money” in 1936.F6F  
Another reason for the neglect of fiscal aspects is the lack of reliable data. At the 
time there were no national accounts and only some of the main aggregates of 
national accounts have since been reconstructed for this period. In the 1920s and 
1930s there was no OECD or IMF to collect comparable data from different 
countries.  
This paper takes a fresh look at fiscal policies during the Great Depression and 
uses a data set compiled from different sources for an empirical analysis of the 
fiscal responses in the years 1924–38. One conclusion that can be drawn from 
this analysis is that some European governments seemed less “helpless” than 
others. For example, Sweden conducted what would today be termed counter-
cyclical policies. However, fiscal policy was not a key factor for recovery in any 
of the economies. The differences and similarities between the Great Depression 
and the current crisis are also briefly discussed.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 discusses the background of the 
crisis and the institutional setting. Section 3 addresses questions related to the 
availability of data, the data set used and methodology. Section 4 provides the 
results and analyses the fiscal policy reaction to the Great Depression. Finally, 
Section 5 draws some general conclusions and discusses whether lessons learned 
from the 1920s and 1930s can be of use in the current economic discussion. 
 
                                              
5 This way of thinking is reflected in several arguments of the time. For example, Tuhti (1932) discussed 
the increase in public expenditure in European countries arguing that domestic transactions, loans and 
government consumption are simply the redistribution of money. According to him, non-domestic loans 
would simply reallocate consumption within time and area. As an example he used Germany, which was 
paying war reparations to other countries. According to Tuhti, this was only the reclassification of income 
(and correctly so because nothing was received in exchange). 
6 For example, similar conclusions to those reached by Keynes were drawn independently by the 
Stockholm School. The best known members of the Stockholm School were: Dag Hammarskjöld, Erik 
Lindahl, Gunnar Myrdahl and Bertil Ohlin. See for instance: Kiander and Vartia (1998), pp. 7–13. 
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2. 1B ackground of the Great Depression and 
institutional setting 
2.1 7B ackground of the Great Depression 
The start of the Great Depression is generally associated with Black Thursday, 24 
October 1929, when the stock markets crashed. It was followed by a second 
strong crash on Black Tuesday, 29 October 1929. While the highest quotation on 
the New York stock exchange was 381 points (1926=100) on 3 September, on 13 
November it had fallen to 198 points. However, this was simply an outward 
manifestation of the crisis rather than the underlying cause. 
The length and seriousness of the Great Depression varied between countries and 
they can thus be classified into three categories: countries which were strongly 
affected by the crisis, i.e. their per capita GDP dropped around 20%; countries 
which were moderately affected by the crisis, i.e. per capita GDP dropped around 
10%; and finally, countries which were hardly affected by the crisis. As Table 1 
shows, the crisis was most pronounced in Austria, Germany and the United 
States where per capita GDP dropped by more than 20% respectively, and in 
France where per capita GDP dropped by almost 20%. The second group 
includes Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Romania, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The variation in duration as 
well as intensity of the crisis is exemplified by Belgium and the Netherlands 
where the crisis lasted longer than in several other European countries, i.e. longer 
than the more common three to four years. The final group of countries, i.e. 
countries which were hardly affected by the crisis, include Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Norway and Portugal. At this stage it should be emphasised that the figures 
presented in Table 1 are only indicative. They were estimated significantly later 
and are based on weak statistical sources.  
What was the underlying reason for the Great Depression? The 1920s was 
generally an unstable economic period and economic fundamentals were 
strained. At the beginning of the 1920s Italy, Norway, the United Kingdom and 
the United States were affected by a short recession.F7F The most plausible and 
generally accepted explanation for the reason behind the crisis which culminated 
in the Great Depression is that the shock of the First World War, coupled with 
the policies adopted afterwards, led to the economic disaster of the inter-war 
years. More specifically, the gold standard – reintroduced in the 1920s to cure the 
instability of the immediate post-war years – prevented the world economy from 
                                              
7 In the case of Norway and the United States, this is not apparent in Table 1 as this depression only 
occurred in 1920 and 1921. The table presents only average growth rates for 1919–25. For these 
countries, the positive growth rates in the remaining years cancel out the negative growth in 1920 and 
1921.  
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dealing with the problems which emerged at the end of the decade and deepened 
in the early 1930s. The failure of institutions which were intended to enhance 
international cooperation, such as the League of Nations, exacerbated the failure 
of national governments to provide leadership and cooperation. Policy failures 
therefore had greater impact than may have been the case in other circumstances 
because the underlying situation was so difficult.F8 
Table 1. GDP per capita growth in European countries and the United 
States 1919–39 (measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis 
dollarsF9F) 
  
1919–
1925 
1925–
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
1934–
1935 
1935–
1939 
Austria 4.0 3.7 1.1 U-3.1 U-8.3 U-10.6 U-3.6 0.6 9.5 
Belgium  7.2 2.6 U-1.7 U-1.5 U-2.4 U-5.2 1.6 1.1 2.7 
Bulgaria 1.5 7.6 U-3.2 8.8 13.2 U-0.7 U0.4 U-3.9 5.2 
Czechoslovakia 4.6 6.1 2.2 U-3.8 U-4.0 U-4.6 U-4.8 U-1.4 4.2 
Denmark 3.4 1.4 6.1 5.2 0.4 U-3.5 2.3 0.9 2.6 
Finland 7.9 5.0 0.4 U-1.9 U-3.2 U-1.2 6.0 3.4 3.3 
France 8.2 1.5 6.3 U-3.8 U-6.5 U-6.5 7.1 U-0.9 3.4 
Germany 2.4 6.3 U-0.9 U-1.9 U-8.1 U-7.9 5.8 3.7 8.8 
Greece 3.7 2.1 4.8 U-3.6 U-5.5 7.2 4.6 0.9 2.2 
Italy U-2.1 2.2 2.6 U-5.7 U-1.4 2.5 U-1.4 2.0 5.0 
Norway 3.5 3.4 9.1 7.1 U-8.4 4.3 1.9 1.8 5.1 
Netherlands 6.0 4.0 U-0.5 U-1.5 U-7.5 U-2.9 U-1.6 U-0.1 3.6 
Portugal 3.3 1.2 9.5 U-2.4 3.8 0.7 5.5 U-0.9 -0.5 
Romania … U-1.3 U-5.9 5.8 0.8 U-6.9 3.5 0.2 1.2 
Spain 2.6 2.6 6.0 U-4.3 U-3.5 1.2 U-2.9 1.0 U-7.0 
Sweden 3.6 4.0 5.8 1.8 U-3.9 U-3.1 1.5 3.3 5.9 
United Kingdom -0.8 2.1 2.7 U-1.1 U-5.6 0.2 2.5 2.4 2.8 
United States 1.5 1.3 5.0 U-9.9 U-8.4 U-13.8 U-2.7 3.4 6.4 
 
Sources: Maddison 2001. Maddison 2003. Author’s calculations. 
 
Note: Bulgaria has estimates from 1924 onwards; Czechoslovakia has estimates from 1920 onwards, 
additionally the time series ends in 1937; Greece has estimates from 1921 onwards; Romania has 
estimates from 1926 onwards, additionally the time series ends in 1938. 
 
                                              
8 See Cameron (1989), pp. 408–419. Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo (1997), pp. 187–190.  
9 The Geary-Khamis dollar, also known as the international dollar, is a hypothetical unit of currency that 
has the same purchasing power the US dollar had in the United States at a given point in time. The years 
1990 or 2000 are often used as a benchmark for comparisons that run through time. It is based on the twin 
concepts of purchasing power parities (PPP) of currencies and the international average prices of 
commodities. It shows how much a local currency unit is worth within the country’s borders. It is used to 
make comparisons both between countries and over time. For example, comparing per capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) of various countries in international dollars, rather than based simply on 
exchange rates, provides a more valid measure to compare standards of living. For further information 
concerning the calculation method, see: Handbook of the International Comparison Programme, Annex 
II, United Nations, New York 1992. 
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The First World War fundamentally changed the world order that had previously 
been in existence. Before the First World War the United Kingdom had occupied 
the leading role in the world economy. It invested significantly abroad and thus 
helped countries which had problems with their balance of payments. 
Additionally, the United Kingdom had a free trade policy and there were markets 
for the goods it imported from all over the world. Countries which had temporary 
financial problems could obtain financing in London by issuing bonds. After the 
First World War the United States occupied this position and became the leading 
country in the world economy. Unfortunately, it was not immediately ready to 
accept this role. The First World War transformed the United States from a net 
foreign debtor to a net foreign creditor.F10F However, its unwillingness to become 
an international actor on the political and economic stage was reflected in its 
trade, monetary and customs policy as well as its immigration policy and overall 
attitude to international cooperation. US policy was closed and protectionist. The 
fact that the United Kingdom was no longer in a position to remain the leading 
power in the world economy was belatedly accepted in the 1930s. With the 
benefit of hindsight, if US policy had been more open, the Great Depression may 
have been shorter and less serious.F11 
The decline began in the United States, where it was also deepest, and was 
transmitted to other countries through several mutually reinforcing channels. 
Such channels operated powerfully because national economies were linked 
together by the fixed exchange rate of the gold standard. Price deflation in the 
United States produced price deflation abroad since the United States accounted 
for more than one-third of the global demand for primary products. US Federal 
Reserve monetary policy, which was less than accommodating, was reinforced 
by the shift from bank deposits into currency induced by financial instability and 
attracted a steady stream of gold into the United States, thus draining reserves 
from other central banks and forcing them to restrict domestic credit in order to 
defend gold convertibility. The decline of US merchandise imports, which was 
initiated by the contraction and reinforced by the Smoot-Hawley TariffF12F, created 
difficulties for foreign manufacturers.F13 
The Great Depression represents the culmination of both an economic and 
financial crisis which developed in parallel. The Great Depression was therefore 
the result of several developments and political misjudgements. On the real 
economy side, decreases in private consumption and investment were the first 
                                              
10 See Eichengreen (1992), pp. 219–220. 
11 See Cameron (1989), pp. 408–419; Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo (1997), pp. 187–190. 
12 The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act (sometimes known as the Hawley-Smoot Tariff Act; officially the Tariff 
Act of 1930) was signed into law on 17 June 1930 and raised US tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods to 
record levels. After it was passed many countries retaliated and increased their own tariffs on US goods. 
As a result American exports and imports were reduced by more than half. 
13 See Eichengreen (1992), pp. 225–226. 
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indications of the Great Depression. This had a multiple impact on other parts of 
the economy by increasing unemployment and consequently further decreasing 
private consumption. As can be seen in Table 2, the development was further fed 
by faster deflation in several countries. Thus the crisis spread through the 
economy and throughout most of the world.F14F On the development of the crisis 
there are lot of literature and for instance ensuing Great Depression, Irving Fisher 
developed a theory called debt-deflationF15F. Additionally, Kenneth Rogoff has 
analysed the development of different economic crisisF16F. 
Table 2. Inflation developments in European countries and the United 
States 1919–39 (as annual changes of cost of living indices) 
  1924–28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934–38 
Austria 7.5 3.1 0.0 -5.0 2.1 -2.1 -0.2 
Belgium  14.3 6.4 0.0 -9.0 -9.9 -1.2 1.6 
Bulgaria 3.4 3.1 -8.0 -13.0 -7.5 -8.1 -2.4 
Czechoslovakia 1.7 -1.0 -2.0 -4.1 -2.1 -1.1 1.7 
Denmark -3.2 -1.0 -5.0 -5.3 -1.1 3.4 2.7 
Finland 1.7 -1.0 -8.0 -7.6 -1.2 -3.6 1.7 
France 11.0 6.4 1.0 -4.0 -9.3 -3.4 6.9 
Germany 4.6 1.0 -4.0 -8.3 -11.4 -1.3 1.3 
Greece 9.8 3.1 -13.0 0.0 5.7 7.6 2.7 
Italy 1.4 32.6 -25.4 -10.3 -2.2 -6.0 4.3 
Norway -3.9 -4.8 -3.0 -5.2 -2.2 -1.1 3.0 
Netherlands -0.6 0.0 -6.0 -5.3 -6.7 0.0 0.1 
Portugal … … -5.0 -11.6 -2.4 0.0 1.0 
Romania 9.7 -1.0 -28.3 -16.9 -6.8 -3.6 4.4 
Spain -0.1 3.1 3.0 3.9 -3.7 -2.9 -0.5 
Sweden -0.8 -1.0 -3.0 -3.1 -2.1 -1.1 1.5 
United Kingdom -1.0 -1.0 -4.0 -6.3 -2.2 -3.4 2.3 
United States 0.6 -1.2 0.0 -7.0 -10.1 -9.8 1.9 
 
Sources: Mitchell, B.R.: International Historical Statistics, Europe 1750–2000, Fifth Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2003. Bureau of Labour Statistics, USA. 
 
Note: The data only start from 1924 due to hyperinflation in the previous years in some European 
countries. The Portuguese inflation series starts from 1930; the Spanish series ends in 1935. 
 
The financial crisis was related to a financing crisis which culminated in a 
banking crisis and the collapse of the gold standard. The United States ceased to 
supply capital to Europe at the previous lavish level and from 1931 onwards was 
                                              
14 See Cameron (1989), pp. 408–419. 
15 See Fisher (1933), pp. 337–357. 
16 For instance he has said that in the current crisis America had the classical preconditions of massive 
finance crisis: trillions of dollars of debt secured by an inexorable deflating asset bubble. Bank 
writedowns already totalled more than $ 500 billion in August 2008. If Lehman had not been allowed to 
fail, some other firm would have, with similar result, according to him. See for instance Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008). 
 7 
 
actually a net recipient of long-term capital. The only other country in a strong 
financial position was France, which attracted ever larger quantities of gold and 
foreign exchange. However, both the US and French authorities refused to take 
steps to relieve the mounting crisis of confidence and liquidity in the rest of the 
world and the banking system was drawn into the gathering storm. A succession 
of bank failures had occurred throughout the 1920s and there were problems of 
varying magnitude in Spain in 1925, Poland in 1926 and 1927, and in Norway 
and Italy in 1927.F17F The problem reached Germany in 1929 when the collapse of 
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Versicherung was followed by the failure of other 
smaller banks and withdrawals from saving banks in Frankfurt and Berlin.F18 
The crisis undermined the entire central European banking system. The second 
largest Austrian bank, Bodencreditanstalt, collapsed in 1929. This was followed 
in 1931 by the failure of the biggest Austrian bank, Credit-AnstaltF19F. Two months 
later one of the major German banks, Darmstädter und Nationalbank, closed its 
doors. Many other European countries suffered bank runs and failures, with an 
especially severe crisis in Hungary where the banks were closely linked to those 
in Austria and Romania. A leading Swiss bank also had to be rescued by a take-
over. By contrast, French banks were generally in a strong position by the end of 
the 1920s and largely avoided the crisis of 1929–31, with only a few failures in 
1930–31. British commercial banks were also largely unscathed, finding strength 
in their branch structure and security in their traditionally cautious policy towards 
involvement in industry.F20 
The banking crisis placed the gold standard under additional strain. In the case of 
the German banking crisis, the Reichsbank ran out of assets and by the beginning 
of July 1931 had fallen below its statutory requirement of 40% reserves. As a 
result, it was unable to borrow any more funds. The French, who had ample 
reserves to lend to the Reichsbank, attached political conditions that were 
unacceptable. Germany finally abandoned the gold standard in July/August 
1931.F21F A few months later, on the 20 September 1931, the United Kingdom also 
abandoned the gold standard. The main reason for this was the weak balance of 
payments position on both the current and the capital account. The banking crisis 
                                              
17 However, there is evidence that in some countries something was learnt from the financial crisis of the 
1920s. By changing certain institutional settings and creating new institutions which supported banking 
system another financial crisis were partly avoided. In Italy the IRI (Istituto per la Ricostruzione 
Industriale) was established on the 23th of January 1933. The IRI provided an effective institutional 
setting for the restructuring of the Italian banking system. The IRI took over the industrial participations 
held by the big commercial banks and cleaned the banking sector's balance sheet of non-performing 
loans. The IRI worked to re-organise technically and financially these enterprises, offloading the shares 
whenever feasible. See for instance: Barbiellini Amidei and Goldstein 2010. 
18 See Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo (1997), pp. 107–117. 
19 Harold James, an economic historian at Princeton University, has said that Lehman’s failure was 
analogous to the collapse of Credit-Anstalt in 1931. 
20 Ibid. 
21 See Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo (1997), pp. 108–110. 
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in continental Europe further exacerbated these problems. By the time the United 
Kingdom was forced to abandon the gold standard, seven other countries 
worldwide had already done so. After its departure, another 24 countries rapidly 
followed suit, including Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, the Irish Free 
State, Greece and Portugal. In Europe, only France, Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Italy, Poland and Lithuania remained linked to the gold standard.F22F 
This solution was originally meant to be temporary but attempts to move back to 
the gold standard were unsuccessful. As already mentioned, adherence to the 
gold standard worsened the effects of the Great Depression. Spain is often cited 
as an example of a country that avoided the worst excesses of the Great 
Depression by remaining outside the gold standard.F23F Additionally, war debts and 
reparations were burdening some European public finances – in particular 
German public finances. Several countries had war debts to the United States and 
it therefore attempted to enforce repayment. Naturally, this served to deepen the 
economic crisis in these European countries. This has been described as one of 
the least successful and is the most criticised aspect of US foreign policy during 
the inter-war era.F24F   
As the banking crisis in Europe spread, US President Hoover announced in 1931 
the suspension of repayments of war debts and reparations for one year. 
Following the so-called Hoover Moratorium, European countries and the United 
States met in Lausanne in June 1932. Practically all payments related to war 
debts and reparations were stopped after this meeting. In 1933 Hitler announced 
that Germany would not pay its war debt and reparations. In fact, the only 
country which repaid its war debts after both the First and Second World War 
was Finland.F25F  
2.2 8BInstitutional setting 
When analysing inter-war fiscal policy, it is important to take into account 
changes in the institutional setting. The reason for this is twofold. First, it is 
debatable whether the public finance policy and economic development of a 
dictatorship can be analysed in the same way as those of a democracy. 
Furthermore, the issue of including war reparations and expenditure specifically 
aimed at sustaining dictatorship in the analysis is rather philosophical as 
preparation for war increases GDP but not welfare. The classical argument of 
                                              
22 In some countries (for instance the United States and France), an attempt was made to cut wages in 
order to avoid devaluation. However, these attempts were unsuccessful. The general conclusion in the 
literature for this failure is that it was a “coordination failure”, i.e. employees would have been willing to 
accept lower wages if they had been confident of the readiness of others to do likewise. Only government 
intervention could break this logjam. See for instance: Eichengreen (1992), pp. 226–228. 
23 Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo (1997), pp. 110–116. 
24 Rhodes (1969), pp. 787. 
25 Cameron (1989), pp. 408–419. 
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welfare economics is that in order to increase the societies welfare from one 
point of time to another, the welfare of everybody has either to increase or stay as 
it is. Even though GDP, which is used as an indication of welfare or well-being, 
increased under the dictatorships in the 1930s, such dictatorships cannot be said 
to have increased overall well-being. 
In addition, both the economy and related economic decisions in a dictatorship 
work in a manner fundamentally different to those in a democracy. In a 
dictatorship, the markets are not free and capital flows are normally limited. In 
some respects, the fascist economies were similar to socialist economic systems 
as in both cases the economy was strictly controlled by the regime.F26F For 
instance, in Germany the Nazis used Four Year Plans to organise their 
investment programme. These plans were in many ways similar to the Soviet 
Five Year Plans. However, according to Feinstein et al. (1997) the Four Year 
Plans under the Nazi regime were even more chaotic than their Soviet 
counterparts at the start of central planning. The Four Year Plans did not replace 
other bureaucracies; they were simply added on top and competed with them. 
Capital markets and prices were also controlled. Private companies were 
terrorised and punished if they put their own interests before those of the Third 
Reich. The Italian fascist regime, which was 11 years older than the Nazi regime, 
provides another example of the parallels between fascist and socialist economic 
planning. In the 1920s, after a brief spell of free trade and market-oriented 
policies (1922–25), Mussolini moved towards a more controlled economy.F27 
Second, governments in dictatorships tend to be larger than those in democracies. 
However, it would be wrong to draw any conclusions concerning the size or 
activity of the public sector on such a basis. For instance, the Four Year Plans 
were clearly directed towards preparation for war. The economic policies of the 
Nazi regime initially brought people back into work, but after a few years their 
focus shifted from reviving the economy to reallocating resources into military 
and supporting activities. Historians have debated whether specific investment 
projects – such as the Autobahns – were actually part of the war effort. There can 
be no doubt that the Nazi regime’s economic policies increasingly favoured 
heavy industry, aeroplane manufacture and armaments. If munitions production 
was not expanded immediately on assumption of power, it had been within a few 
years.F28F Table 3 shows the institutional establishment of European countries in 
1919–33 and 1933–39, according to which countries can be divided into three 
categories. First, countries which were already dictatorships in the beginning of 
                                              
26 This is a political debate. However, dictatorships are rarely interested in growing the economy as such 
and the motives of growth are ideologically driven. Thus GDP growth was not measured as such in the 
Soviet bloc, rather the statistical system focused on capturing whether the objectives of the Five Year 
Plans, and thereby also their underlying ideological purpose, were attained. 
27 Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo (1997), pp. 174–175. 
28 Ibid. 
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the 1920s and remained dictatorships in the 1930s. Second, countries in which 
the political regime changed in the 1930s and became a dictatorship. The 
beginning of the 1930s was a politically restless period throughout Europe and 
there were several attempts to assume political power using non-democratic 
means: some failed, others were successful. The third category comprises 
countries which remained democracies during the entire inter-war period.  
Table 3. Institutional establishment in the European countries in the  
inter-war period 
Country 1919–1933 1933–1939 Comment 
Austria Democracy Dictatorship
3/1933 onwards coup d’état if Dollfuss: dicatorship by 
the semi -fascist "Fatherland Front" 
Belgium Democracy Democracy   
Bulgaria Dictatorship Dictatorship
6/1923 until 1930 and again 1934 onwards a putsch of 
officers 
Czechoslovakia Democracy Democracy   
Denmark Democracy Democracy   
Estonia Democracy Dictatorship 3/1934 onwards dictatorship of Konstatin Paets 
Finland Democracy Democracy   
France Democracy Democracy   
Germany Democracy Dictatorship 1/1933 onwards Hitler's seizure of power 
Greece Democracy Dictatorship 8/1936 onwards coup d’état by General Metaxas 
Hungary Democracy Democracy   
Ireland (Irish Free 
State) Democracy Democracy   
Italy Dictatorship Dictatorship 10/1922 onwards B. Mussolini 
Latvia Democracy Dictatorship
5/1934 onwards by the coup d’état by K. Ulmanis: 
presidential dictatorship 
Lithuania Dictatorship Dictatorship
12/1926 to 1929 dictorial regime of 
Smetona/Voldemaras. 12/1932 onwards authorian one 
party state 
Luxembourg Democracy Democracy   
Netherlands Democracy Democracy   
Norway Democracy Democracy   
Poland Dictatorship Dictatorship 5/1926 onwards military putsch by Pilsudski 
Portugal Dictatorship Dictatorship
5/1926 onwards military uprising by General Gomez da 
Costa, who was driven from power by General 
Carmona. 7/1932 onwards the formation of Salazar 
government 
Romania Democracy Dictatorship
2/1930 Personal regime of King Carol II turned into a 
royal dicatatorship in 1938 by coup d’état 
Spain Dictatorship Dictatorship
9/1923 until 1930 Primo de Riviera and 9/1936 General 
Franco 
Sweden Democracy Democracy   
Switzerland Democracy Democracy   
United Kingdom Democracy Democracy   
Yugoslavia Dictatorship Dictatorship 1/1929 onwards coup d’état by King Alexander 
 
Source: Kinder and Hilgemann (1978), pp. 138–139. 
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The first category of countries which were already dictatorships in the 1920s 
includes Bulgaria, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Yugoslavia. The 
second category of countries in which a fascist or semi-fascist group assumed 
political power in the 1930s includes Estonia, Germany, Greece, Latvia and 
Romania. The third category of countries which remained democratic comprises 
Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, the Irish Free 
State, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom (and of course the United States).   
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3. 2BData and methodology 
The crisis which led to the Great Depression was both economic and financial in 
nature. However, as governments did not react to the financial crisis, they 
allowed banks to collapse and go bankrupt. Therefore the reaction to the financial 
shock is not analysed in this paper and the paper focuses only on the economic 
crisis. 
The first issue is how to measure fiscal policies and, in particular, how to 
measure expansionary and contractionary fiscal policies using the limited amount 
of available data. A neutral fiscal policy implies when the changes in cyclically 
adjusted budget balances are zero. In the optimal case budget would be in 
balance where G = T (Government spending = Tax revenue). Government 
spending is fully funded by tax revenue and overall the budget outcome has a 
neutral effect on the level of economic activity. An expansionary fiscal policy 
involves a net increase in the government deficit (G > T) through rises in 
government spending or a fall in tax revenue, or a combination of the two and 
thus, also an increase of in changes in the cyclically adjusted budget balances. 
This leads to a larger budget deficit or a smaller budget surplus than previously 
experienced, or a deficit if the budget had previously been balanced. A 
contractionary fiscal policy (G < T) occurs through higher tax revenue or reduced 
government spending, or a combination of the two. This would lead to a lower 
budget deficit or a larger surplus than previously experienced, or a surplus if the 
budget had previously been balanced (in terms of cyclically adjusted budget 
balances).  
Fiscal policy can be used by governments to influence the level of aggregate 
demand in the economy in an effort to achieve the economic objectives of full 
employment and economic growth. Keynesian economics suggests that adjusting 
government spending and tax rates are the best ways to stimulate aggregate 
demand. This can be used in times of recession or low economic activity as an 
essential tool in providing the framework for stronger economic growth and 
moving towards full employment. 
Unfortunately, there are certain limitations to the data available for the period 
under examination and it was not possible to find a systematic data source for 
unemployment or tax rates. Therefore this paper utilises practically all the data 
available from international sources. In the 1920s and 1930s there was no OECD 
or IMF to define and collect comparable data from different countries. Although 
the League of Nations collected some fiscal data and published them in the 
Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, the majority of data available are 
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purely national data sources collected for national use and therefore not 
internationally comparable.F29 
In practice the following data are available for this analysis: central government 
debt, central government deficit, central government expenditure and revenue. 
Additionally there are current and constant price GDP estimations, which are 
estimated ex post as statistical institutes started to compile national accounts after 
the Second World War.  
Often fiscal policies are analysed by examining cyclically-adjusted budget 
balances. However, as a result of the lack of data a rather simplistic method has 
been used to estimate cyclically-adjusted budget balances (CAB), which are 
consequently defined as follows:  
(1.) YBGOBCAB ,*ζΔ−=  
where B stands for budget balance in relation to GDP, GOΔ  for the change in 
output gab and YB,ζ for the coefficient which defines the effect of the output gab 
and is approximated in this case as government expenditure in relation to GDP. 
The output gabs are estimated by calculating GDP trends using the Hodrick-
Prescott (1997) filterF30F and then defining the GDP caps equal to the differences 
of development of actual GDP and GDP trends.F31F The underlying GDP series are 
GDP per capita growth measured in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars.F32 
Cyclically-adjusted budget balances are a better indication of expansionary or 
contractionary fiscal policies than non-adjusted budget balances because budget 
imbalances can increase as a result of the degenerating economic situation. Such 
budget imbalances can often be run by decreasing revenue rather than increasing 
expenditure. The cyclical adjustment in the balance corrects this effect. As the 
quality of the estimated cyclically-adjusted budget balances is not optimal, this 
paper additionally presents the actual budget balances where the effect of the 
degenerating economic situation is not eliminated. During the Great Depression 
the reason for decreasing revenues was the falling number of taxable entities 
rather than decreasing tax rates. Unfortunately, there is no taxation data available 
which would help verify whether a decrease in taxation played a role in the 
decrease of revenues. 
Therefore this paper focuses on analysing government expenditure using two 
complementary methods. First, central government expenditures as a 
                                              
29 Virén (2006) also reached this conclusion in his work when comparing fiscal policies before and after 
the Second World War.  
30 The smoothing parameter λ=100 was used. 
31 For further details see the April 2002 issue of the ECB’s Monthly Bulletin. 
32 Maddison 2001 and Maddison 2003. 
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contribution to GDP growth is estimated. Second, simple linear regressions 
between central government expenditure growth and GDP growth are estimated. 
Central government contributions to GDP growth are calculated by first deflating 
government expenditure by an implicit GDP price index or cost of living index. 
The data used are discussed later in this paper. The impact of the growth in 
government expenditure on GDP growth is then calculated as follows 
when GDP (Y) is defined as: 
(2.) MXGICY −+++=  
where C stands for private consumption, I for investment, G for government 
consumption, X for exports and M for imports. 
The growth rates are defined as follows: 
(3.) 11 /)( −−−=Δ ttt YYYY  
then growth can be presented as: 
(4.) 111111 /)( −−−−−− +−−−−−+++=Δ ttttttttttt YMXGICMXGICY  
and when the contribution of government expenditure (of which growth in 
relation to the total is actually calculated) to GDP growth is calculated, all the 
other components except government consumption (which can be equal to t-1 if 
there is no increase but is normally unequal to t-1) are defined to be equal in 
period t and t-1, i.e. 1−= tt CC ; 1−= tt II ;  1/ −−=≠ tt GG ; 1−= tt XX  and 
1−
=
tt MM , the formula can be presented as: 
(5.) 11 /)( −−−=Δ tttG YGGY  
where GYΔ  stands for the government expenditure contribution for GDP growth.  
If the contributions are calculated similarly for all the components, then: 
(6.) MXGIC XXYYYY Δ−Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ . 
However, it should be noted that the available government data are government 
expenditures and thus, the data do not cover only government consumption and 
investments but also transfers to other sectors. Transfers have an effect on the 
other components of the formula and from this point of view there is a small 
estimation error in the formula. However, this error should not have a large 
contribution to the results as it is safe to assume that the central government 
transfers to the other sectors were considerably small. 
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The second calculation, i.e. the linear regressions between the growth in real 
government expenditure and GDP growth rates have been calculated as follows:  
when the regression line (model) between iY  (government expenditure growth at 
constant prices) and iX  (GDP growth) and i = 1,…, n is: 
(7.)  iii XY εβα ++=  
where α  is the Y intercept, β  is the slope of the line and iε  is a random term 
associated with each observation. 
As we are estimating the regression between iY  and iX , we are particularly 
interested in the slope of the line β : 
(8.) 
2
1
1
)`(
))((
xx
yyxx
N
i
i
N
i
ii
−
−−
=


=
=β  
and α  is calculated as follows: 
(9.) xy βα −=  
The linear regression described above has been run to verify whether there is a 
relation between government consumption growth and a decrease in GDP. The 
assumption behind this hypothesis is that if government expenditure increases 
when GDP decreases, and the growth of real government expenditure increases 
less or decreases less when GDP grows then the policy is counter-cyclical. If the 
increase of GDP and real government expenditure has a positive correlation then 
the policy is pro-cyclical.  
However, it should be borne in mind that the indication of this regression 
analysis is very weak as the number of the observations is low. The low number 
of the observations allows possible outliers to disturb the results. However, as 
will be discussed later in this paper, the data have already been control before 
hand in such a way that the most of the implausible data are excluded. 
Additionally, it should be borne in mind that the quality of the data do not only 
effect on the regression analysis but also to the other results presented in this 
paper. 
The counter-cyclical growth of real government expenditure does not mean that 
fiscal policy would be counter-cyclical. If this is financed by increasing taxes 
then the fiscal effect is neutral. Unfortunately, there is no annual taxation data 
available, but an assessment of how the policy was financed has been performed 
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by estimating cyclically-adjusted budget balances and compiling annual 
government debt-to-GDP ratios, as well as compiling budget deficit numbers for 
the countries. 
Fiscal policy can also react after a short time-lag, i.e. it usually takes a little while 
before the government realises that the country is in a recession and expansionary 
fiscal policy is needed. As the data used are annual data and the quality of data 
with regard to time periodsF33F are not totally reliable, corrections concerning the 
time periods have not been performed. 
The analysis covers the years from 1926 to 1938. The starting year is selected 
partly on the basis that the data are incomplete before 1926 or appear to be 
implausible. These data would have caused strange results in the data analysis 
and therefore, the data excluded.F34F This aims at eliminating improbable 
conclusions which are not directly related to the Great Depression.  
The data used in this paper were collected from several sources. As there are 
various problems regarding data quality, the data were cross-checked using 
available sources. The most plausible estimate was then used and therefore the 
figures themselves are also based on several sources. Government expenditure 
and revenue data are based mainly on the historical statistics compiled by B.R. 
Mitchell.F35F However, some of the country data presented here are not plausible, 
for instance the growth rates or magnitude of the series were not deemed 
credible. In these cases, the data from the Statistical Yearbook of the League of 
the Nations have been used.F36F However, both data sets remain problematic and 
the data are not fully comparable across countries. In some cases, the accounting 
period is the calendar year and in others it is not. There are also several 
accounting changes within the time series. Additionally, in most cases the time 
series do not include direct (re)armament expenditure, while in some, these are 
included. Finally, for some countries there are no data for the whole time period. 
An effort was made to take these issues into account and, in some instances, the 
data have been adjusted.  
A further weakness is that the estimates include only central government data, 
i.e. the fiscal activities of municipalities and local governments are not captured. 
The reason is that there is no international data source which would include local 
                                              
33 The accounting years are often not identical to the calendar year. 
34 Due to this reason, also some countries like Belgium are left out of this analysis. The quality problems 
in the data are fundamental in these cases and thus, the data were implausible. 
35 Mitchell, B. R.: International Historical Statistics, Europe 1750–2000, Fifth Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York 2003. 
36 Countries which are included in the analysis at this stage are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, Sweden and the United States. The Greek, Italian and US data are based on League of Nations 
data. 
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government data for this time period. However, it can be assumed that local 
governments were not active in fiscal policies. Table 4 shows a comparison of 
the size of central government expenditure and total government expenditure in 
some countries, thus illustrating that a large part of government expenditure is 
not considered due to this lack of data. 
Table 4. Comparison of the share (%) of total government expenditure of 
GDP (by Maddison) and the share (%) of central government 
expenditure of GDP (by League of Nations) in 1938 
  1938-Maddison 1938-League of Nations 
France 23.2 13.22 
Germany 42.4 12.73 
Netherlands 21.7 19.37 
United Kingdom 28.8 20.18 
United States 19.8 10.18 
 
Source: Total government expenditure: Maddison 1995. Central government expenditure: League of 
Nations (1927–1944): Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1927–1942/44, Geneva. The Bureau 
of Economic Analysis, USA. Author’s calculations. 
 
Note: Central government expenditure for Germany is from 1934. 
 
The GDP data used in the ratio and growth contributions are also based on B.R. 
Mitchell’s data. Only the US data are based on data from the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. The national accounts data were estimated after the period 
under examination because countries only started to compile national accounts 
after the Second World War.F37F As a result, there are several quality issues related 
to the national accounts data. Statistical sources in the 1930s were not compiled 
on the basis of reliable and comparable national accounts. The GDP estimates do 
not include any estimates of income in kind, such as the rental value of owner-
occupied housing or farmers’ consumption of their own products, although these 
two items are of relative importance for the period under analysis. Finally, the 
quality of the goods at constant price estimates has the same designation.F38F There 
are no GDP estimates available for Czechoslovakia, Portugal and Romania, and, 
in addition, some time series do not cover the whole time period. These issues 
and other methodological remarks are mentioned under the tables. 
Government expenditure is deflated with the implicit GDP price index of B.R. 
Mitchell. However, in some cases, the price indices are implausible and therefore 
the cost of living index has been used instead. Finally, as a result of the highly 
                                              
37 The compilation of national accounts and the overall development of statistical analysis occurred partly 
a result of the Great Depression. Keynesian economic theory and the Great Depression reinforced the 
need for better statistical systems which would help the coordination of economic policies. 
38 Mitchell, B. R.: International Historical Statistics, Europe 1750–2000, Fifth Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York 2003. 
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problematic nature of the Belgian data, the time series is incomplete and growth 
rates implausible, it was decided to remove Belgium from the analysis. 
In the case of the linear regression analysis, the estimates of GDP growth are 
based on Maddison (2001, 2003). These estimates are presented as constant 
Geary-Khamis dollars per capita, which are generally considered the most 
appropriate for describing economic growth for this period. As the time period is 
short, the fact that these are presented in per capita terms does not significantly 
affect the growth rates. 
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4. 3BFiscal policies in the inter-war period 
Based on Equation 5, Table 5 shows the growth contributions of central 
government expenditure to GDP and GDP growth. Based on Equation 8, Table 6 
shows a summary of the results of the linear regression analysis. The detailed 
results of the linear regression analysis are presented in Annex 1. The 
conclusions which can be drawn from these two tables are similar. Additionally, 
Table 7 presents conventional budget balances and Table 8 shows cyclically-
adjusted budget balances based on Equation 1. Finally, Table 9 presents 
estimated central government debt-to-GDP ratios. 
The results suggest that the majority of countries had quite responsive fiscal 
policies – when the economy was growing government expenditure also 
increased and when the economy was contracting, after a short delay, 
government expenditure also started to decrease. In Germany, Finland and Spain 
there is a slightly stronger indication of pro-cyclical policies.  
For the majority of countries, policies were neither pro nor counter-cyclical in the 
inter-war period. As already discussed, the Great Depression’s impact also varied 
across countries. The regression analysis suggests that in rare cases there is a 
clear dependency between GDP growth and government expenditure. If the 
coefficient in Table 6 is positive, this indicates policy is pro-cyclical; if the 
coefficient is negative government consumption is increasing in real terms when 
GDP growth is negative. However, this cannot be considered convincing 
evidence because the number of observations is quite limited.  
A few countries did employ counter-cyclical fiscal policies. The expansionary 
fiscal policy employed by the United States is evident in the data. However, the 
conclusions concerning US fiscal policies are only partially confirmed as the 
time series in this analysis only starts from 1930. The main criticism regarding 
US fiscal policies in previous studies is that the expansionary policies started 
relatively late. Cary Brown (1956) concluded in his article that the federal 
government’s fiscal action was more expansionary throughout the 1930s than it 
was in 1929. It can also be seen in Table 5 that economic policy was only slightly 
expansionary at the beginning of the 1930s, and only after Franklin D. Roosevelt 
introduced the New Deal in 1933 did US government expenditure start to be 
aggressively expansionary. Eichengreen (1992) emphasised that the most 
important fiscal change of the period in the United States was in 1932; and it was 
a tax increase not a reduction. As shown in Table 7, central government budget 
deficits were increasing but were still moderate until 1932. Table 8 confirms this 
observation as cyclically-adjusted budget balances only increased remarkably in 
the latter part of the Great Depression. The driving force behind budget deficits 
until 1932 was decreasing revenues. As can be seen in Table 9, this led to an 
increase in central government debt. However, the importance of the New Deal 
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in the recovery is debatable. Rather it is the role of monetary policy and the 
abandonment of the gold standard which are considered key to recovery from the 
Great Depression. 
Table 5. Central government expenditure’s contribution to GDP growth 
(CG) rates and GDP growth rates 
  1925–28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934–38 
  CG GDP CG GDP CG GDP CG GDP CG GDP CG GDP CG GDP
Austria 1.2 4.0 -0.2 1.5 2.8 -2.8 0.9 -8.1 -4.4 -10.2 -4.1 -3.4 -3.0 2.8
Belgium  … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Bulgaria -0.6 5.5 4.2 -3.4 -2.8 -5.4 -1.3 5.7 -1.1 -5.4 1.0 0.0 1.3 10.0
Czechoslovakia … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Denmark 0.2 2.4 -0.2 6.7 0.5 6.0 0.3 1.1 0.4 -2.6 -0.4 3.2 0.3 10.0
Finland 1.8 6.1 -1.2 1.2 2.5 -1.4 -0.3 -2.3 -6.1 -0.5 1.1 6.7 1.1 6.7
France 3.5 2.0 1.1 6.7 -1.1 -2.9 3.6 -6.0 -2.5 -6.5 6.3 7.1 -1.3 1.1
Germany 1.0 5.0 -0.3 -4.2 0.8 -4.6 -1.0 -10.9 -0.8 -4.9 0.8 13.4 -4.9 12.9
Greece 3.7 0.0 -3.7 -4.3 7.3 8.9 0.6 -8.2 -5.4 6.7 -0.6 2.1 0.4 3.9
Italy -0.9 3.5 2.2 1.5 4.4 -5.9 -2.5 -0.8 4.0 3.9 6.8 -0.8 0.6 3.2
Norway 0.8 6.2 0.5 10.7 0.0 3.9 0.4 -7.5 -0.1 2.8 -1.3 1.2 0.4 5.5
Netherlands -0.1 4.3 0.5 2.2 0.9 2.2 3.0 -5.9 1.5 -3.6 2.2 -3.0 0.2 5.5
Portugal … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Romania … … … … … … … … … … … … … …
Spain 0.1 4.4 0.9 2.6 0.5 -0.3 0.5 1.6 1.4 3.8 0.8 -0.9 -0.1 1.4
Sweden 0.0 5.1 0.7 7.7 0.6 5.7 0.6 -7.0 1.3 -2.4 2.5 2.3 0.2 4.6
United Kingdom 0.3 2.3 0.6 2.4 0.8 -0.1 2.4 7.8 -3.9 -23.6 2.6 16.6 0.8 4.3
USA … … … … 0.5 -8.6 1.5 -6.4 1.3 -13.0 3.4 -1.3 0.2 6.9
 
Source: League of Nations (1927–1944): Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1927–1942/44, 
Geneva. The Bureau of Economic Analysis, USA. Author’s calculations. 
 
Note: GDP estimates are based on League of Nations data and are not the same as those in Table 1. The 
reason for this is that the government expenditure data and GDP data presented are based on the same 
source and are thus consistent. The German series begins from 1925 and ends in 1935. The Austrian 
series ends in 1937. The Spanish series ends in 1935. The Greek series begins from 1928. The US series 
begins in 1930. 
 
In Europe, the Netherlands and Sweden seem to have been conducting 
expansionary fiscal policies. Sweden, which is often referred to as conducting 
Keynesian fiscal policy even before Keynes, has some indication of a counter-
cyclical fiscal policy. As can be seen in Table 5, in 1931 and 1932 when the 
economy was declining, government expenditure was positively contributing to 
economic growth. Table 6 also indicates that Swedish fiscal policy was slightly 
expansionary, although the P-value indicates the result is not very reliable and 
the results of the regression analysis are not very reliable due to the reasons 
mentioned earlier in this paper. During the Great Depression, the Swedish budget 
deficit and government debt also increased. As illustrated in Table 8, cyclically-
adjusted budget balances were actually improving until 1931 and after this the 
Swedish government started to expand its fiscal policy. This slight counter-
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cyclical fiscal policy is also confirmed in the existing literature. For instance, 
Gustafsson et al. (1974) observed that fiscal policy acted as a slight positive 
impulse for economic recovery. However, they added that Sweden also increased 
taxes during the Great Depression in order to finance government actions. 
Jonung (1981) has emphasised that although fiscal policy in Sweden was slightly 
counter-cyclical, monetary policy was mainly responsible for the recovery. It 
should also be noted that Sweden was one of the countries which left the gold 
standard at quite an early stage. 
As previously mentioned, the crisis in the Netherlands lasted slightly longer than 
in other European countries. The GDP growth estimates presented in Table 5 
slightly overestimate GDP growth and the estimates presented in Table 1 are 
more accurate, i.e. the crisis actually started in the Netherlands in 1929 and, as 
both sources indicate, continued until 1934.  
Table 6. Summary of the linear regression analysis between GDP growth 
and real government expenditure growth (detailed results are 
presented in Annex 1)  
  co-efficient P-value R-square 
Austria 0.1582 0.2195 0.1465 
Belgium             …        …        … 
Bulgaria -0.1171 0.5431 0.0381 
Czechoslovakia          …        …        … 
Denmark 0.0080 0.9394 0.0006 
Finland 0.1431 0.0851 0.2675 
France 0.0147 0.8700 0.0028 
Germany 0.3491 0.0546 0.4315 
Greece -0.2236 0.0220 0.5008 
Italy -0.0380 0.3821 0.0771 
Norway 0.0510 0.7430 0.0112 
Netherlands -0.2979 0.0232 0.4177 
Portugal       …       …        … 
Romania       …       …        … 
Spain 0.1532 0.1545 0.2361 
Sweden -0.1412 0.1832 0.1698 
United Kingdom -0.0521 0.7367 0.0118 
USA -0.4107 0.0327 0.5602 
 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
Note: The German series begins in 1925 and ends in 1935. The Austrian series ends in 1937. The Spanish 
series ends in 1935. The Greek series begins in 1928. The US series begins in 1930. 
 
Both Tables 5 and 6 indicate that Dutch fiscal policy was counter-cyclical. As 
can be seen in Table 6, when compared to other countries the R-square is quite 
high and the P-value is low, which indicates that the result is relatively reliable. 
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However, as mentioned earlier, the results of the regression are not very reliable. 
As can be seen in Table 8, cyclically-adjusted budget balances confirm this 
observation. Despite the expansionary fiscal policy, the Netherlands did not 
recover quickly. The main underlying reason is that the Netherlands only left the 
gold standard in 1936 when France also devalued its currency. In the current 
literature, Dutch fiscal policy is considered neutral or contractionary and only 
deemed expansive towards the end of the crisis. This analysis indicates that fiscal 
policy was actually slightly expansionary at the beginning of the crisis. As can be 
seen in Tables 7 and 8, Dutch government deficit and debt increased during the 
crisis. This paper confirms that even though Dutch fiscal policy was expansive, 
the effect was not strong enough to enable the country to avoid the crisis. 
Table 7. Central government budget balances 
  1924–28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934–38
Austria -6.4 -6.8 -9.7 -11.5 0.0 -5.8 -4.1
Belgium  -1.2 … -2.5 … … … -5.0
Bulgaria -1.8 -6.7 -5.3 -3.0 -2.1 -1.4 -0.7
Czechoslovakia … … … … … … …
Denmark -0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.9 0.7
Finland -1.6 -0.8 -1.9 -2.3 -2.6 -1.6 -3.3
France 0.0 -0.9 2.8 0.0 0.0 -2.0 -1.1
Germany -1.7 -1.8 -2.5 -2.2 -1.9 1.0 …
Greece … -0.3 … -5.5 0.6 0.5 0.6
Italy -1.3 -1.5 -3.9 -0.9 -3.4 -2.5 -3.3
Norway -6.7 -6.5 -6.1 -7.0 -6.7 -5.4 -5.2
Netherlands -2.4 -1.9 -2.5 -6.6 -8.6 -11.3 -8.8
Portugal … … … … … … …
Romania … … … … … … …
Spain -0.6 1.1 0.8 -0.3 -0.8 -1.3 -1.4
Sweden -1.0 -0.6 -0.3 -0.4 -2.0 -4.1 -2.2
United Kingdom 1.2 0.8 1.0 0.8 -0.2 1.0 0.4
USA … 0.2 -1.0 -3.8 -5.2 -7.1 -3.3
 
Source: Mitchell, B. R.: International Historical Statistics, Europe 1750–2000, Fifth Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York, 2003. League of Nations (1927–1944): Statistical Yearbook of the League of 
Nations, 1927–1942/44, Geneva. The Bureau of Economic Analysis, USA. Author’s calculations. 
 
Note: The Belgian series is incomplete in 1925–26, 1928–29 and 1930–33. The French figure for 1924 is 
implausible and therefore not used in the table. The German series covers only 1925–33. The Spanish 
series ends in 1935. The Greek series does not cover the years 1924–28 and 1930. The US series starts 
from 1929. 
 
Tables 5 and 6 also show Greek fiscal policies seem to be counter-cyclical. 
However, it would be wrong to conclude that Greece conducted fiscal policy 
along Keynesian lines. The Great Depression did not affect Greece too seriously 
and during the few years of depression the Greek government did not adopt a 
particularly expansionary fiscal policy. The negative coefficient of the linear 
regression can be explained by the decrease in government expenditure when the 
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economy was growing rather than expansionary fiscal policy when the economy 
was contracting. 
In the other countries analysed, fiscal policies seemed to be defined by budget 
balance. Several studies dealing with Finnish economic policies also suggest it 
was neo-classical and that revenues basically defined expenditure.F39F Cyclically-
adjusted budget balances confirm that the deficit was increasing over time and 
that the increase was not related to the Great Depression as such. Articles 
discussing Danish fiscal policies also confirm that inter-war period fiscal policy 
was neo-classical. Academic debate has mainly been concerned with the benefits 
and drawbacks of Keynesian policy.F40 
Table 8. Cyclically-adjusted budget balances  
  1924–28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934–38
Austria -6.8 -7.0 -9.2 -9.8 1.3 -5.3 -4.4
Belgium  -1.2 ... -2.2 ... ... ... -5.2
Bulgaria -2.1 -5.4 -6.2 -4.5 -1.7 -1.1 -0.8
Czechoslovakia … ... … ... … … …
Denmark -0.1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.8 0.7
Finland -2.3 -0.4 -1.0 -0.9 -1.8 -2.2 -3.7
France 0.0 -1.6 3.3 1.1 1.0 -3.4 -1.2
Germany -2.0 -1.6 -2.1 -1.1 -0.7 0.7 …
Greece … -1.0 1.3 -3.5 -0.6 -0.1 0.5
Italy -1.4 -1.8 -2.6 -0.5 -3.7 -1.7 -3.5
Norway -6.7 -7.0 -6.4 -6.0 -6.8 -5.3 -3.5
Netherlands -2.6 -1.8 -2.3 -5.5 -8.2 -11.0 -9.0
Portugal … ... … … … … …
Romania … ... … … … … …
Spain -0.7 0.6 1.2 0.0 -1.1 -1.2 -2.0
Sweden -1.1 -0.9 -0.3 0.2 -1.3 -3.9 -2.4
United Kingdom 1.0 0.5 1.5 2.2 0.2 0.9 0.1
USA … ... … -3.3 -4.1 -6.8 -3.6
 
Source: Mitchell, B. R.: International Historical Statistics, Europe 1750–2000, Fifth Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York 2003. League of Nations (1927–1944): Statistical Yearbook of the League of 
Nations, 1927–1942/44, Geneva. The Bureau of Economic Analysis, USA. Author’s calculations. 
 
Note: The Belgian series is incomplete in 1925–26, 1928–29 and 1930–33. The French figure for 1924 is 
implausible and therefore not used in the table. The German series only covers 1925–33. The Spanish 
series ends in 1935. The Greek series does not cover the years 1924–28 and 1930. The US series starts 
from 1929. 
 
As already discussed, several countries became dictatorships in the 1930s. In 
these countries one could expect fiscal policies to be expansionary as 
                                              
39 Beckman, Johansen, Sejerstedt and Vartiainen 1974, pp. 37–39. Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 1993, pp.  
96–104. 
40 Topp 1988. 
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dictatorships are based on central planning and a government-controlled 
economy. However, analysis of the data does not confirm this assumption. As 
indicated in the tables, the time series for several dictatorships end at the 
beginning of 1930s. In addition, direct military expenditure is excluded in most 
of the government expenditure estimates. As a result, for the majority of the 
countries analysed government expenditure is underestimated. However, direct 
military expenditure is not related to strategies aimed at recovering from the 
Great Depression and this should be taken into consideration when evaluating the 
significance of the exclusion of such data. Secondly, as discussed earlier, these 
expenditures were specifically aimed to destroy rather than increase welfare, as 
the classical welfare economy expects, and therefore, these also should be 
excluded from the analysis.  
Table 9. Central government debt-to-GDP ratios  
  1924–28 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934–38
Austria 21.2 15.6 16.1 21.5 23.7 36.5 38.5
Belgium  123.7 … 78.7 … … … 98.3
Bulgaria 36.3 40.6 46.1 51.7 58.0 64.1 53.5
Czechoslovakia … … … … … … …
Denmark 22.8 20.2 23.8 24.2 24.7 22.9 19.6
Finland 11.1 13.1 15.8 17.8 28.8 26.9 14.8
France 96.6 83.3 83.8 94.7 106.8 111.0 126.6
Germany 6.8 11.3 14.4 20.7 23.9 21.7 18.5
Greece 79.2 84.9 89.7 105.8 97.8 88.1 78.6
Italy 63.8 64.0 71.9 83.9 90.9 99.8 97.2
Norway 32.6 37.6 35.8 39.5 39.5 40.4 31.8
Netherlands 54.5 43.5 43.7 48.8 58.4 64.7 72.6
Portugal … … … … … … …
Romania … … … … … … …
Spain 58.2 59.9 65.2 64.2 61.6 65.1 60.7
Sweden 20.4 19.0 18.4 21.6 26.9 29.6 23.5
United Kingdom 187.4 179.3 179.7 185.9 194.8 208.3 182.6
USA … 16.3 17.8 22.0 33.2 40.0 40.6
 
Source: Mitchell, B. R.: International Historical Statistics, Europe 1750–2000, Fifth Edition, Palgrave 
Macmillan, New York 2003. League of Nations (1927–1944): Statistical Yearbook of the League of 
Nations, 1927–1942/44, Geneva. The Bureau of Economic Analysis, USA. Author’s calculations. 
 
Note: The Austrian series covers only 1924–37. The Belgian series is incomplete for 1925–26, 1928–29 
and 1931–33. The Bulgarian series is incomplete for 1924–26. The Spanish series is incomplete for  
1924–26 and 1936–38. The French series is incomplete for 1924 and additionally only covers domestic 
debt and thus excludes war debt. The German series excludes 1924. The Greek series excludes 1924–27. 
The Italian series excludes 1937–38. The US series excludes 1924–28. 
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5. 4BEpilogue: the past and the present 
Are there any lessons that might be drawn from the historical events studied in 
this paper? It is said that history does not repeat itself. Nevertheless, several 
similarities between the Great Depression and today’s financial and economic 
crisis can be observed. However, firm conclusions should not be drawn from 
these as the world today is a very different place to that of the 1930s. In the 
1930s the effects of the First World War could still be felt and residual problems 
related to the war had yet to be solved. The resultant increased political 
instability hindered democracy from developing strong foundations in several 
countries. The world economy and financial markets were not as integrated as 
they are today and national markets were far more protected. Finally, the level of 
development was also markedly different – for instance the importance of the 
non-monetary economy was much greater than today – and this is not fully 
captured in the estimates used in this paper. 
At the start of the Great Depression, several countries experienced a financial 
crisis similar to the current crisis. However, the policy reaction was very 
different. During the Great Depression banks and insurance companies were not 
rescued and this increased problems regarding financial intermediation. 
With regard to the importance of fiscal policies in the 1930s, it can be concluded 
that fiscal policies in most of the European countries analysed were neo-classical 
where revenue defined expenditure – although in several countries the crisis led 
to an increase in central government deficit and debt. In certain countries, there is 
some evidence of slight expansionary fiscal policies. Sweden, which recovered 
quickly from the crisis, increased government expenditure during the Great 
Depression. The Netherlands, where the Great Depression was relatively long, 
also conducted an expansionary fiscal policy in the 1930s. The fiscal policies in 
these countries assisted recovery but, as also concluded in several previous 
studies, monetary policy played a more significant role.F41F It is also noteworthy 
that these economies were democracies and thus there is no any implications on 
the interpretation of these results as discussed in section 2.1. However, the 
contributions of these national economies are negligible compared with today’s 
fiscal rescue packages.  
From the point of view of Keynesian fiscal policy, the most important 
contribution of the Great Depression was that counter-cyclical economic policy 
was inaugurated as a policy option and the importance of economic policy was 
realised. As a result, statistics and national accounts were developed further and 
an increasing amount of resources dedicated to economic research. 
                                              
41 See for instance: Feinstein, Temin and Toniolo 1997, pp. 187–204. 
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Overall, when the underlying reasons of the Great Depression are analysed, the 
importance of international cooperation becomes ever more apparent. During 
economic downturns, protectionism tends to increase: the Great Depression is a 
monument to the potentially shocking consequences of such a development. 
Protectionist and nationalist policy options also seem to be increasingly on the 
agenda in today’s crisis – as demonstrated in the form of huge rescue packages 
given directly to specific industries deemed of national importance. However, 
during the Great Depression protectionism manifested itself in a slightly different 
form from that seen today – the main tool employed being the direct limiting of 
world trade and capital movements. 
Furthermore, during the Great Depression the change in world economic 
leadership was only realised in the 1930s. In the aftermath of the First World 
War, the United Kingdom was no longer in a position to remain the leading 
world economic power and the United States took over this role. As this change 
was not immediately perceived, closed US policies served to deepen the 
recession. Today’s crisis shows signs of a potentially similar constellation. The 
Chinese and Indian economies are growing quickly and they are increasingly 
important players in the world economy. However, media and economic 
discussion still focus on the United States – although it may well be that China 
and India come to play predominant roles in the recovery process of the current 
crisis. The difference is of course that China and India are opening rather than 
closing their economies – and that during the current crisis they have increased 
investment in western economies.  
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6BAnnex 1. Country level linear regression calculations 
between GDP growth and real government expenditure 
growth 
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SUMMARY OUTPUT: Austria
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.382717452
R Square 0.146472648
Adjusted R Square 0.061119913
Standard Error 4.827263674
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 39.9890542 39.9890542 1.716086163 0.219490643
Residual 10 233.0247458 23.30247458
Total 11 273.0138
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.530330648 1.396053818 -0.379878369 0.711978975 -3.640932937 2.580271641 -3.640932937 2.580271641
X Variable 1 0.158196816 0.120761415 1.309994719 0.219490643 -0.110876431 0.427270063 -0.110876431 0.427270063  
SUMMARY OUTPUT: Bulgaria
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.19525365
R Square 0.038123988
Adjusted R Square -0.058063613
Standard Error 11.27158489
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 50.35576543 50.35576543 0.396350335 0.543095133
Residual 10 1270.48626 127.048626
Total 11 1320.842025
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 5.724493662 3.442163874 1.663050881 0.127280026 -1.945126727 13.39411405 -1.945126727 13.39411405
X Variable 1 -0.117122817 0.1860381 -0.629563607 0.543095133 -0.531641608 0.297395974 -0.531641608 0.297395974  
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Denmark
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SUMMARY OUTPUT: Denmark
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.024640856
R Square 0.000607172
Adjusted R Square -0.099332111
Standard Error 2.654880001
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.042821823 0.042821823 0.006075407 0.939409458
Residual 10 70.48387818 7.048387818
Total 11 70.5267
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 2.185561187 0.805954026 2.711769053 0.021867107 0.389783397 3.981338977 0.389783397 3.981338977
X Variable 1 0.007952866 0.102031909 0.077944896 0.939409458 -0.219388433 0.235294166 -0.219388433 0.235294166  
SUMMARY OUTPUT. France
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.053033126
R Square 0.002812512
Adjusted R Square -0.096906236
Standard Error 5.392114229
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.820041441 0.820041441 0.02820445 0.869976974
Residual 10 290.7489586 29.07489586
Total 11 291.569
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 0.696356607 1.578113275 0.44125895 0.668413228 -2.819899502 4.212612716 -2.819899502 4.212612716
X Variable 1 0.014739974 0.087768344 0.167941805 0.869976974 -0.180820116 0.210300064 -0.180820116 0.210300064  
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Greece
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SUMMARY OUTPUT: Germany
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.656853052
R Square 0.431455932
Adjusted R Square 0.35023535
Standard Error 5.194607066
Observations 9
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 143.3427576 143.3427576 5.31215026 0.054602704
Residual 7 188.887598 26.98394257
Total 8 332.2303556
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -1.099213515 1.992351571 -0.55171664 0.598305597 -5.810372986 3.611945956 -5.810372986 3.611945956
X Variable 1 0.349141693 0.151483921 2.304810244 0.054602704 -0.009060604 0.707343989 -0.009060604 0.707343989  
SUMMARY OUTPUT: Greece
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.707677405
R Square 0.50080731
Adjusted R Square 0.438408224
Standard Error 3.997614074
Observations 10
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 128.2608637 128.2608637 8.025875699 0.022048251
Residual 8 127.8473463 15.98091829
Total 9 256.10821
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 3.168857667 1.296231195 2.444670116 0.040270098 0.179741237 6.157974097 0.179741237 6.157974097
X Variable 1 -0.22363665 0.078939935 -2.832997653 0.022048251 -0.405672583 -0.041600716 -0.405672583 -0.041600716  
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Norway
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SUMMARY OUTPUT: Norway
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.106017461
R Square 0.011239702
Adjusted R Square -0.087636328
Standard Error 4.480072779
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 2.28157062 2.28157062 0.11367469 0.742968267
Residual 10 200.710521 20.0710521
Total 11 202.9920917
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 3.146031709 1.3878865 2.26677881 0.046826175 0.053627342 6.238436076 0.053627342 6.238436076
X Variable 1 0.051007613 0.151287521 0.337156773 0.742968267 -0.28608205 0.388097275 -0.28608205 0.388097275  
SUMMARY OUTPUT: Netherlands
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.64629572
R Square 0.417698158
Adjusted R Square 0.359467974
Standard Error 3.356452279
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 80.81190598 80.81190598 7.173224053 0.023160706
Residual 10 112.657719 11.2657719
Total 11 193.469625
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 2.15798464 1.10728466 1.948897803 0.079894188 -0.309199757 4.625169037 -0.309199757 4.625169037
X Variable 1 -0.29787529 0.111218563 -2.678287522 0.023160706 -0.545685735 -0.050064845 -0.545685735 -0.050064845  
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SUMMARY OUTPUT: Spain
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.485928825
R Square 0.236126823
Adjusted R Square 0.140642676
Standard Error 3.677388582
Observations 10
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 33.44206575 33.44206575 2.472942679 0.154465399
Residual 8 108.1854943 13.52318678
Total 9 141.62756
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept -0.113568624 1.247824752 -0.09101328 0.929719646 -2.991059524 2.763922276 -2.991059524 2.763922276
X Variable 1 0.153201766 0.097421934 1.572559277 0.154465399 -0.071453762 0.377857293 -0.071453762 0.377857293  
SUMMARY OUTPUT: UK
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.108693419
R Square 0.011814259
Adjusted R Square -0.087004315
Standard Error 4.040953365
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 1.952250726 1.952250726 0.119555047 0.736681298
Residual 10 163.2930409 16.32930409
Total 11 165.2452917
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 1.783546429 1.220727047 1.461052603 0.174698122 -0.936403402 4.503496261 -0.936403402 4.503496261
X Variable 1 -0.052084336 0.150634057 -0.345767331 0.736681298 -0.387717989 0.283549317 -0.387717989 0.283549317  
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SUMMARY OUTPUT: USA
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.748458063
R Square 0.560189471
Adjusted R Square 0.486887717
Standard Error 6.937079438
Observations 8
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 367.7679732 367.7679732 7.642238214 0.032660802
Residual 6 288.7384268 48.12307114
Total 7 656.5064
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 4.411503142 3.02004918 1.460738842 0.194389099 -2.978296391 11.80130268 -2.978296391 11.80130268
X Variable 1 -0.410679304 0.148556799 -2.764459841 0.032660802 -0.774184961 -0.047173647 -0.774184961 -0.047173647  
SUMMARY OUTPUT: Finland
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.51717158
R Square 0.267466443
Adjusted R Square 0.194213087
Standard Error 3.714539498
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 50.37925482 50.37925482 3.651251748 0.085088912
Residual 10 137.9780368 13.79780368
Total 11 188.3572917
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 2.758463378 1.121433779 2.459764838 0.03369002 0.259752772 5.257173983 0.259752772 5.257173983
X Variable 1 0.143067333 0.074872027 1.910824887 0.085088912 -0.023757969 0.309892634 -0.023757969 0.309892634  
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SUMMARY OUTPUT: Italy
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.277751637
R Square 0.077145972
Adjusted R Square -0.015139431
Standard Error 4.245337811
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 15.06623538 15.06623538 0.835949882 0.382074315
Residual 10 180.2289313 18.02289313
Total 11 195.2951667
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 1.584856002 1.31392029 1.20620407 0.255500794 -1.342741352 4.512453356 -1.342741352 4.512453356
X Variable 1 -0.037960513 0.041518528 -0.914302949 0.382074315 -0.130469575 0.054548549 -0.130469575 0.054548549  
SUMMARY OUTPUT: Sweden
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0.412032338
R Square 0.169770648
Adjusted R Square 0.086747712
Standard Error 3.400926053
Observations 12
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 23.65151148 23.65151148 2.044864436 0.183212263
Residual 10 115.6629802 11.56629802
Total 11 139.3144917
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95.0% Upper 95.0%
Intercept 3.962307883 1.131061455 3.503176477 0.005696199 1.442145475 6.482470291 1.442145475 6.482470291
X Variable 1 -0.141165634 0.098718085 -1.429987565 0.183212263 -0.361123274 0.078792005 -0.361123274 0.078792005  
Source: League of Nations (1927–1944): Statistical Yearbook of the League of Nations, 1927–1942/44, 
Geneva. Maddison 2001. Maddison 2003. Author’s calculations. 
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